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th
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democracy’ fulfils a useful role as mask that hides from us the great political, ethical and legal changes 
entailed in such a move.  
 
Keywords: 
 
 
Neo-democracy; neo-liberalism; human rights; civil liberties; security 
 
 
 1 
  
  
Introduction 
In a recent book I reflected on the layers of meaning that can be given to the terms 
‘liberty’ and ‘security’ (Gearty 2013).  So far as the second of these is concerned, that 
book identifies three understandings that attach themselves to the word.  First there is 
‘national’ security, where the primary interest lies in the protection of a piece of land: 
a territory, a nation or a state.  Then, second, there is the more human-centred way in 
which we use the term, to connote our safety from attack, our freedom from violent 
intrusion, our individual (and family) ‘security’ in our person and in our homes, a 
‘feeling of peace’ that allows us ‘to move forward with a sense of security’ (Johnson 
and Clifford 2003: 1). More ambitious – but still human-centred – is a third, broader, 
approach which sees security as something that we have which gives us protection 
against circumstances in our lives that damage our potential, a safety-net lying below 
us (guaranteeing a home, health-care, schools for our children, etc) while we negotiate 
the tricky tightrope of life that is eventually to lead us to what we hope will be a 
dignified end (Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 2008). This last 
resonates with the work done in the field of human security which has seeks to 
disentangle ideas of security from the discourse of terrorism, not least in order to 
explain and perhaps therefore help reduce specific outbursts of political violence 
(Zwitter 2010).  
 
‘Liberty’ is an even more multi-layered idea than ‘security’ but for present 
purposes we can also identify three relevant meanings, each of which has the 
advantage here of being to some degree the partner of one of the meanings of security 
that I have just identified. First there is liberty as a condition of political being, of 
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living in a free state, a place where freedom is thought of as something a community 
enjoys as a collective entity (Gearty 2007). (This corresponds with ‘national security’ 
above.)  Second there is the liberty of the individual from outside interference, liberty 
in the negative sense, a guarantee of non-interference (going beyond but certainly 
incorporating individual security from attack etc. – see famously Isaiah Berlin 
(1979)). Third there is what is often called in contrast to this proposition (with its 
suggestion of liberty as non-interference), the more prescriptive concept of positive 
liberty, the freedom of the individual to lead a successful life, one in which he or she 
flourishes, realising his or her potential to the greatest possible extent (Taylor 1991).  
Now this last cannot be done all by ourselves. Building on an already stretched 
metaphor from the last paragraph, such a reading of liberty requires a ladder onto the 
tightrope so that life can be as daringly accomplished as the walker desires – but that 
ladder would never be ascended without the walker knowing there was always going 
to be security against a fall - not many of us are so foolish as to want to be Icarus, 
whatever the risk. That ladder can be put in place for some by families or by friends, 
but not everyone is so fortunate. So this kind of liberty does to a great or lesser extent 
assume an interventionist obligation on the part of a third party, and that in a 
democracy is invariably assumed not only to be family or some part of civil society 
but the state as well, through its delivery of pre-school support, education, health 
services, and so on. 
 
I need at this stage in my preparation for what follows to weave a third term 
into my argument, namely ‘human rights’.  It is clear that the phrase ‘human rights’ 
can also accommodate all these meanings of security and liberty within its capacious 
linguistic lodgings.
i
 Liberty is an individual right as well as a state of living integral to 
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a functioning, human-rights-respecting society (the right to vote; freedom of political 
expression; etc.). It is also something towards which, in its very broadest meaning, 
our language of social and economic rights aspires, with its guarantee of just those 
entitlements that I have identified as the essential building blocks for a successful life.  
And these rights, too, are exactly those that we see as essential to human security, 
which are designed to prevent our decline (through misfortune or our own 
foolishness) into abject impoverishment.  Just as there is positive and negative liberty, 
so too are there positive and negative conceptualisations of specific rights, each 
capturing the difference between a condition natural to us which should not be 
interfered with (i.e. thinking, believing, walking, talking, assembling, associating) and 
one which may require the actions of a third party to bring about (such as food on the 
table; a roof over our heads; a place for our children to learn).
ii
 Human rights are our 
new way of saying these old things in a powerful modern way: they complement 
rather than subvert traditional understandings of liberty and security, bringing a fresh 
sense of urgency and of moral obligation to the discussion. 
 
In what follows, I intend to take these readings of liberty and security (and of 
human rights) for granted, or rather more accurately to set their complexities aside for 
now. I don’t want or feel I need to spend time analysing their hidden intellectual 
depths. Rather I see them here in a deliberately naïve way as being uncomplicatedly 
about individuals being able (in human rights terms entitled) to lead good lives in a 
free society, given the chance to succeed while being protected from extremes of 
distress. The focus here is, therefore, not on what liberty and security (and human 
rights) entail. Rather it is on what I suggest is the difficult, less frequently asked 
question of who actually gets to enjoy these freedoms/securities/rights as a matter of 
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practice: the really interesting issue is one of reach, not remit. Who enjoys these 
advantages in life now? Who has done so in the past? What does the future hold? My 
main focus in this article is on the second of these questions as a route to reflections 
on the third.  My concern will be largely (but not entirely) with just two jurisdictions, 
the United Kingdom and the United States, though I draw European countries in 
towards the end and (so far as the history is concerned) what I have to say may well 
be capable of being rolled out across many of the capitalist, colonising states that 
engaged in a successful power struggle with socialism in the 20
th
 century.  So at its 
most general (and ambitious), this article is about the reach of liberty and security in 
the 20
th
 century and what this tells us about where we might be headed in the 21
st
.   
As we shall see it has been the deployment of the language of security that has made 
possible the achievement of what is described here as neo-democracy. It has been the 
Trojan horse within which the warriors intent on reconfiguring the substance of our 
political ideas have been hiding, and through receipt of which our polity has put its 
freedom at risk. 
 
The perspective of this article is primarily that of law and of the history of 
civil liberties in practice. The intention is to complement the growing field of security 
studies in criminology that examines critically underlying assumptions about what we 
– as a demos; as a culture – mean by security (Valverde 2011). It aims, too, to connect 
with scholarship that concerns itself with how salience is achieved for the ‘everyday 
security’ that is of such enormous concern today (Crawford and Hutchinson 2016). Of 
course there is already an important range of work that engages directly with this field 
from the perspective of law and criminology (Hudson and Ugelvik 2012; Bigo and 
Tsoukala 2008; Goold and Lazarus 2007). There are essays in this special issue that 
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approach the issues dealt with here from other perspectives, that of the contemporary 
security/securisation debate for example (Virta and Branders 2016; Crawford and 
Hutchinson 2016), and also that of the scholar of criminology. The expert on 
terrorism has a particular perspective too (Cooper and Walker 2016).  The inter-
disciplinary light which this particular contribution seeks to throw on the wider 
security/liberty connections revealed elsewhere has its primary focus in law but in 
locating itself in this way the piece emphasises in particular the way that legal power 
has absorbed a rhetoric of liberty without ever making full concessions to the need to 
deliver equal security for all.  The hope is that this enquiry will assist in locating the 
law and practice of contemporary civil liberties insofar as it has been affected by 
issues of security in a way that adds understanding to both writers in the more 
sociologically-minded arena and to those whose interests lie in the more orthodox 
‘black-letter’ law domain.   Each ‘side’ of the discussion has much to learn from the 
other.   
 
Crucial here is the distinction between law and practice. The argument is that 
the capacity of the law to mask truths on the ground behind a veneer of fine principle 
- long known to critical legal historians - is enjoying a great revival as a camouflage 
for the inequality that, it is argued, is part and parcel of neo-liberalism. By drawing it 
to the surface in the way it does, this article intends to give a warning to those in other 
fields not to reach too unsceptically for ideas rooted in legal principle that are in fact 
more partisan than they seem. The piece is offered, too, as a counter to any argument 
about the present that too easily succumbs to the temptation to fortify itself with 
memories of a supposed golden age, of freedom, or democracy, or whatever it might 
be.  ‘Security’ has long proved a dangerously open term in the hands of judges, and 
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‘liberty’ a high-flung phrase that can be too easily subjugated to partisan readings of 
what security is declared to necessitate by those with the power to dominate 
discourse. 
 
The central argument is that in the mature democratic societies under 
examination  (primarily the UK and the US but encompassing continental European 
states and other well-embedded democratic states as well) the reach of liberty and 
security is narrowing, that the enjoyment of these two prerequisites of a successful 
life is becoming available to substantially fewer people than the assumptions of 
equality and universality that lie behind the democratic ideal would seem to suggest. 
The article argues that this move reflects the lack of the deep entrenchment of a 
democratic way of thinking even in the countries under scrutiny that appear so inured 
to it: indeed one of the necessary suggestions in the essay is that it has been the 
vagaries of international relations (including war and the fear of war) that have done 
more to embed democracy than any amount of good arguments or collectivist 
expressions of solidarity. The vulnerability of the democratic sensibility identified by 
the analysis here as having always being present has been exposed by the post-1989 
resurgence of the market as (not for the first time in history) the seemingly invincible 
arbitrator of right and wrong, not only in the US and the UK but further afield as well.  
This shift has been at least eased and perhaps even caused by ‘neo-liberalism’ – an 
ideology that puts market exchange at the heart of human experience and sees 
governance as ‘rooted in entrepreneurial values such as competitiveness, self-interest, 
and decentralisation’ (Steger and Roy 2010: 12). Taking things at face value, never 
questioning the justice or morality of the resource-allocations it finds in the snapshot 
of the moment upon which it acts, neo-liberalism has inevitably proved itself 
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attractive to those with power in the market, with resources to augment rather than a 
living to eke out. I shall have more to say about the rise of this particular brand of late 
20
th
 century market primacy later – its assault on the democratic assumptions of that 
century has not been as yet fully frontal; rather it has availed of the inherent 
weaknesses in the prevailing systems that have been (as I argue) present from their 
inception to eat away at their core, reducing them too often to mere appearance rather 
than substantive reality: ‘neo-democracy’.  When that appearance is fully rotten to the 
core, it will be time to dispense with it entirely. The ‘useful idiot’iii will have done its 
job. There are already some signs of this afoot, as we shall see. This might be – but is 
not inevitably – what the future holds.  
 
The false assumption of progress  
 
Before we turn to this history as our route to an understanding of our possible futures, 
a few words are needed by way of answer to the first of the three questions posed a 
little earlier – concerning the present, about who enjoys liberty and security today. 
Many might not unreasonably assert that this concern for remit simply no longer 
arises. By the end of the last century, the achievement of liberty and security (in all 
three of the shapes mentioned earlier) had certainly widely come to be believed to be, 
within democratic polities at any rate, universal – liberty and security truly were (or 
were assumed to be) available to all.  This was because of what had gone before: in 
the 20
th
 century, fuelled by the reformist energies that naturally followed the social 
disaster of not one but two global wars, not only had democracy secured a firm grip 
on many states but the rule of law had increasingly come to be seen as a protection for 
all against governmental abuse of power. These breakthroughs matter here because 
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both ‘democracy’ and ‘rule of law’ are near sine-qua-nons for a ‘liberty’ and 
‘security’ that is universal (see Bingham (2011) on this inter-connectedness). And 
after 1945 human rights increasingly became the medium through which the richer 
versions of security and liberty, identified above, came to be expressed (Simpson 
2004: Chapters 13 and 14).  The apotheosis of this era of progress was the year 1989, 
when with the collapse of the Soviet Union and its Communist empire, and (it should 
be added) turmoil in China, it seemed the people (and peoples) of the whole world 
were within reach of both liberty and security.  Here on full display was the 
confidence of late 20
th
 century liberal democratic culture: if Fukuyama’s (1992) now 
notorious ‘end of history’ was marked ‘liberty and security for all’, the traveller 
showing up in on Millennium night, 31 December 1999, could be easily persuaded 
that he or she had arrived. 
 
If the years since the momentous events of 1989 seem to have confirmed 
liberty and security as universals either present or imminent everywhere, then they 
have also produced something of a mystery.  On the one hand, we have continued to 
have this apparently unparalleled march of democracy, the rule of law and the 
protection of fundamental human rights; liberty and security for all in other words.  
Elections are held almost everywhere. Judges are declared to be independent in the 
written constitutions incorporating democratic values that now dot the globe. The 
UN’s commitment to human rights, accepted by the vast majority of states, 
increasingly embraces new rights (persons with disabilities; indigenous peoples), new 
mechanisms of protection (a UN high commissioner, special rapporteurs) and novel 
experiments in the legal enforcement of rights with a strongly social dimension 
(protocols to established treaties) (Tomuschat 2008; de Schutter 2010).  On the other 
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hand, there is still a lot of poverty about in these democratic/human rights 
environments (Pogge 2008). Many have not been able to get on the tightrope and for 
those who have fallen off there will often be great hardship with little prospect of 
return – either for themselves or (increasingly) their children. The evidence tends to 
show the age of democracy and human rights is also one of deprivation and want 
(Oxfam 2015; OECD 2015).  Moreover, the onset of austerity politics has further 
exacerbated the tension between poverty and human rights (see O’Connell 2013; 
Nolan 2014). This dark side to contemporary prosperity – with its widespread 
inequality (Alston 2015; and more generally Atkinson 2015) - appears to mock the 
claims of such cultures to have delivered on the universals to which their 
constitutions, their foundational principles and the speeches of their democratic 
leaders have committed (and continue to commit) them. As Thomas Piketty (2014) in 
his recent book shows, the logic of the contemporary organisation of capital points to 
a relentless increase in inequality, with more and more falling into the hands of fewer 
and fewer, and that democratic forms of government have by no means prevented 
this. In the countries under particular focus here, the gulf between ‘the haves’ and ‘the 
have-nots’ is getting bigger, and the pool of ‘haves’ is shrinking too while the very 
few grab ever more for themselves.
iv
 
 
How can both these trends exist side by side? This is where the return to the 
past heralded in our second question shows itself to be relevant, becomes indeed a 
useful if salutary guide not only to where we are today but where we might be going 
to tomorrow. This assumption that we should all have such protections and 
opportunities is, after all, very new, and amazingly ambitious (see Tuomisaari and 
Slotte (2015) for much of the broad historical background). Being both novel and 
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idealistic, its grip on culture is shallower than many of its optimistic protagonists 
allow.  In their origins, the remit of neither liberty nor security was never seriously 
believed to be universal. The Greeks talked only of freemen and Romans had their 
slaves, as did – notoriously – Thomas Jefferson (and even after the abolition of 
slavery in America of course this land of freedom had its ‘Indians’ to exterminate) 
(Giltaij and Tuori 2015). For much of the industrial era, the great majority of men and 
all of the women were disabled from voting in every capitalist country. Poverty was 
evident and (as exploitation grew) increasingly extensive in its impact and appalling 
in its consequences.  The poor were seen only by a few – their influence on ethical 
discussion was correspondingly minimal (see the class accounts of Frederick Engels 
(2009) and Henry Mayhew 2008). The universalist breakthroughs of the 20
th
 century 
were anticipated by the democratisation and labour movements of the late 18
th
 and 
early 19
th
 centuries – their campaigns and strikes were bitterly resisted by established 
power (famously described by E.P. Thompson (1963)); indeed it is not obvious that 
they would have eventually borne fruit in the way they did without the later impetus 
of war (Pugh 1978). 
 
If the layer of universalism thrown down over our culture is indeed as shallow 
today as it is (relatively) fresh, might this explain its lack of grip, the mismatch 
between what is claimed and the facts to be found on the ground, some of them 
detailed above? The health of any living surface depends on sustenance from below. 
In every country where democracy and human rights have become successfully 
embedded, they have been wrested out of a situation of prior inequality. As a result 
even in their pomp their victory has never been total. Blank slates do not exist in 
history. In our two main subject jurisdictions, the UK and the US, power and 
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affluence – for want of a better expression, the legatees of the ‘gilded age’ – have 
always fought back hard, resisting the move to universal liberty and security and 
afterwards to universal human/civil rights, and this has been despite whatever the 
system of government and constitutional principle have seemed to suggest.  This 
retaliation has not prevented the march of universal liberty and security but the hostile 
skirmishing involved has weakened both, rendering each vulnerable to the present day 
debilitations that afflict them.  
 
The hold of the local, of the family, of self-interest, of commitment to our own 
(or whom we think of as our own) remains deep; indeed some would say these rival 
particularities – or some of them at least - are getting stronger: the topsoil is affected 
by a resurgence in (antagonist) activity below. Lip service is still paid to universality 
in the way that younger generations pretend to obey their elders, following the forms 
but not the substance of obedience. Battered by an increasingly robust rival 
perspective on truth, the conditions needed for the success of universal liberty and 
security become harder to come by, the ethic that they offer humanity less secure than 
it seems, more liable to pressure from below and unpredictable activity from above, 
challenging surface assumptions. The job of the constitution, the courts and the rule of 
law, often honourably resisted by individual judges and benches it must be said, 
increasingly becomes the doing of lip service to universality. By asserting in this way 
the equality of all, the market’s allocation of wealth as power desires and 
accumulators of capital demand is masked in a way that allows such unfairness to 
thrive unnoticed. 
 
The struggle for civil liberties 
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In the days up to and including the ‘gilded age’ itself (Twain and Dudley 1873/2002) 
which is broadly from the late 18
th
century through to the onset of the First World War 
in the UK while starting after the civil war in the US, no democratic or human rights 
scruples held power back, and the judges were almost entirely the servants of that 
power, capital (Jones et al. 2013; see also Fink 1990; Buhle and Dawles 1989).  The 
results were predictable and frequently repeated: workers got shot; strikers were 
starved into submission; the army was mobilised if the going got rough; and reformers 
were hanged, jailed or transported (Wilson 2009; Dunn 2005). True (universal 
suffrage) democracy was a despicable plot by socialists to destroy society. Human 
rights (literally in the eyes of many philosophers – see Macpherson (1962)) belonged 
to the propertied, that is to those with the resources required to enjoy the privileges of 
ownership. In the UK, the US and beyond, law was a necessary control on the poor 
and a useful referee to determine arguments among the powerful (Horowitz 1992). 
There were two histories, one for the rich full of parliamentary manoeuvres and high 
politics infused by a tradition of liberty that was as deeply felt as it was (in terms of 
its reach) emasculated; the other often unwritten, a ‘people’s history’ of protest, 
suffering and class solidarity (Thompson 1963; Sedley 2011). 
 
It was only with the slow embedding of democratic culture that the universal 
character of the value of liberty and the principle of the rule of law needed to be 
acknowledged (Pearce 2003) – democratic success (as earlier noted, forged out of the 
blood sacrifices of global war (Pugh 1978)) demanded at least this.  Just when it 
became impossible to deny the legitimacy of democracy, however, it became possible 
to tar the proponents of any kind of radical vision of what democratic equality 
entailed with the brush of foreign subversion. War created such pressure for change as 
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to make mass suffrage inevitable – while at the same time equipping power to resist 
its most radical effects: democracy could not be gainsaid but its more terrifying 
implications could be avoided.  It has not been sufficiently acknowledged by those 
complacent about the successes of today that 20
th
century democracy has never existed 
in a non-emergency situation (Ewing and Gearty 2000). The aftershocks of the 
Russian revolution of 1917 translated into a horror of Bolshevik-style ambition that 
outside the new USSR came to incorporate (on the part of the privileged) a deep fear 
of the use of emerging democratic institutions to achieve the same end. In the United 
Kingdom, therefore, we see the defence of the realm legislation morphing into 
peacetime controls on speech and assembly that were used effectively to control 
radical political engagement through the 1920s, attacking the Communist and even 
the Labour parties not as local sources of a rival political vision but as agents of a 
foreign power (Ewing and Gearty: Chs 2-4).  In the United States espionage laws 
clamped down on the potentially successful political speech of the Socialist Eugene 
Debs, withstanding first amendment challenge in the process.
v
 Before the war Debs 
had been an important domestic political figure arguing a socialist agenda, sharing 
much in common with other local movements such as the Populist Party and the 
Knights of Labour: during and after it he was a traitor seeking to wage war on his own 
people, not for his class but against his country.     
 
The legacy of the 1914-18 conflict was that in both the US and the UK – the 
onset of democracy notwithstanding - it became impossible to tackle inequality (in the 
shape of vast capital accumulators or exorbitantly-scaled property owners) in any kind 
of radical way without seeming thereby also to be attacking the nation’s institutions. 
Love of country was required to embrace love of privilege (or at least acceptance of 
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the unfairness it epitomised as part of this commitment to the greater ideal). No true 
patriot could criticise the inequality that - it now became apparent - the onset of 
democracy may have ameliorated but had certainly not destroyed. The history of the 
‘red Scare’ of the decade after the First World War is one of a continuing coming-
together in one of these two threats to the security of the nation, the first posed to the 
institutions of the state by forces that sought to overthrow these in the name of 
communist revolution, and the second aimed at the wealthy whose privileges had 
survived into the new era of mass suffrage and whose commitment to an unequal 
status quo was believed by the radical reformers/revolutionaries to require immediate 
remedial action.  The United States saw the Palmer raids (Walker 1990: 43-5), the 
breaking of the steel strike of 1919 (Brody 1987) and continued persecution of 
Communist and socialist speech.
vi
 The United Kingdom has the emergency legislation 
that followed the first war (Emergency Powers Act 1920), the successful defeat of the 
general strike in 1926 (Ewing and Gearty 2000: 155-213) and the hounding of the 
Communist party through the 1920s (including the prosecution of its leadership for 
sedition (ibid.: 136-44).  In both countries the story of civil liberties in the 1920s and 
early 1930s becomes largely one of resisting the controls supposedly necessitated by 
these two interlinked threats, to the institutions of the state and to the privileged 
within it.  ‘National’ security was successfully elided with the security required by the 
rich. In London the hunger marches were brutally dispersed by the police (ibid.: 214-
74; Dyson 1994), while in Washington outgoing president Herbert Hoover ordered 
the military authorities to disperse the ‘bonus army’ of veterans who had camped 
outside the White House in search of justice for their cause (Smith 2007: 282-4). 
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This interwar period in Britain has interesting parallels with the current 
position in the US and the UK – and an important difference. As now there were 
frequent protests: huge marches, demonstrations, petitions, inflammatory meetings in 
public and private halls, and so on (Ewing and Gearty 2000: Chs 5-6). The UK 
national government of 1931-35 shared many similarities with the coalition 
established to deal with the economic emergency in 2010 which (just as in 1935) was 
replaced in 2015 by a Conservative administration: a multiparty administration 
coalesced around a set of policies which were rooted in the assumption that 
household-style balancing of the books was the way to restore prosperity (Skidlesky 
1967), and a National Economy Act of 1931 which authorised a range of across the 
board cuts in welfare and public services (Ewing and Gearty 2000: 216). In contrast to 
today, however, the opponents of such measures could plausibly be assimilated to 
external threats to the integrity of the state itself, represented by the Communist Party 
with its subversives at home and powerful foreign backers abroad. The Party was 
undeniably involved with the opposition to the cuts, it was supported by and 
supported the Soviet Union and it made common and effective cause with the many 
others who were fighting for social justice at the time (Pelling 1958). The links made 
at the time of the Red Scare directly after the first war had also been similarly not 
implausible, particularly at a time when the rhetoric of the new Soviet Union was 
suffused with the expectation of world revolution. This elision between the external 
and the internal challenges was frustrating for those seeking to deal with domestic 
injustice in its own terms but it could not be castigated as utterly without foundation. 
It is as though the public today could be credibly presented with the idea that it is Al-
Qaeda/terrorist extremists who are organising today’s popular campaigns against 
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ongoing budget cuts.  (As we shall see later, and almost incredibly, an effort has been 
made to make just this sort of connection.) 
 
We conclude this section by noting another parallel that is worth observing 
given our interest here in the breath of liberty and security, a point built upon the 
insights of many of the criminologists already referred to and others who have 
engaged critically with liberal assumptions about justice (Hudson 2003; Schauer 
2015).  So far as 1930s Britain was concerned, the equivalent political activities of 
Oswald Mosley’s fascists to those of the left-wing agitators went largely without 
notice in Britain. They were given the run of the streets and the halls.  So far as they 
were concerned, the British tradition of liberty, free speech and tolerance that had 
existed prior to democratisation were frequently invoked in defence of police refusals 
to intervene (Dyson 1994).  And what was that tradition upon which the authorities 
then relied to defend their inaction against fascists?  It drew its rhetorical force from a 
belief that Britain had always been a free country, which it had of course – but only 
for the few. A ringing and deeply embedded language of liberty and freedom was 
available for those who wanted to use it – but it had been a language which had at the 
same time and in the name of the security of the rich (personal and property) also 
allowed the most brutal attacks on democrats and socialists and trade unionists and 
others who challenged the system - the state violence of early capitalism and of the 
‘gilded age’ to which I have already referred.  This selectivity was surely supposed to 
have ended with the achievement of democracy - the UK even had a Labour 
government in 1924 and again from 1929 until 1931. Anticipating the contemporary 
language of Prevent to which we shall presently turn, long serving Home Secretary 
Sir William Joynson-Hicks defended to Parliament his pre-judgment in a public place 
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of the trial of leading Communists by asserting that there was no issue of principle to 
be worried about so far as his remarks were concerned because here were men who 
had been engaged in the ‘wrong sort of speech’.vii  The rules of the game did not 
apply to them. The violence of the fascists in contrast was aimed at defending the 
unequal status quo, not subverting it.   
 
Controlling social democracy 
 
These trends were confirmed and amplified after the Second World War.  They were 
reflected in the structures put in place in newly democratic states after the end of that 
conflict.  The US and UK had defeated fascism but could not have done so without 
the support of (and huge sacrifices made by) their Soviet allies. Europe beckoned as a 
reward for this particular victor, and resisting its advances produced the Cold War. It 
is now much better understood quite the extent to which the language of human rights 
was seen by many at this time as a liberal democratic ally in the struggle against 
Stalinist ambition. The defeated European powers were constructed along lines which 
reasserted democratic forms for sure but these were now to be explicitly tamed by 
judicial oversight.  Brian Simpson’s (2004) history and afterwards work by scholars 
like Marco Duranti (2012) has shown how the appeal of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (agreed in 1950 and coming into force in 1953) lay in the support it 
promised for liberal democratic values, reflected as civil and political rights and also 
(in an early protocol) the right to property.   Europe was to be allowed social 
democracy – but only of a fairly timid sort.   
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The beauty of the human rights approach after the Second World War was that 
it deepened the universal language of liberty (the ‘rights of mankind’ after all) while 
at the same time rendering permissible action against dangerous (socialist; egalitarian) 
liberty in the name of security.  The new European constitutions made truly radical 
politics impossible (Mandel 1998). Special provisions in the European Convention 
allowed the authorities in signatory states to attack threats to freedom in the name of 
freedom (e.g. Article 17).  The Communist party could be banned in West Germany
viii
 
and deprived of all freedom of radical manoeuvre in Italy (Mandel 1998: 269-70).  
Appeals to the new politico-judicial framework established in Strasbourg to police the 
new human rights settlement proved unavailing, hardly surprising in view of the very 
particular, politicised construction of the rights instrument whose job it was to 
police.
ix
  The guarantee of universal liberty and security paradoxically required 
continued restrictions on their reach. Exactly the same trend was to be found in the 
United States where in these post Rooseveltian days it was not the language of human 
rights but rather (as in the 1918-32 period) the equivalent declarations of freedom in 
the countries ‘Bill of Rights’ which were mustered to underpin (and therefore 
legitimise) the Cold War. ‘McCarthyism’ was a guarantor of rather than an affront to 
freedom.
x
  In the United Kingdom, where a new culture of rights was slow in 
emerging, the inter-war language of liberty was simply repackaged to underpin 
resistance to radical change (Street 1963; Williams 1965). 
 
There was a hearkening back here to the days of the Red Scare with the 
opponents of ongoing inequality and injustice being once again elided with those 
whose activities could still plausibly be represented as a Communist-inspired threat to 
the state (Jansen 1988; Mahony 1989). Once again the two main parties, of Left and 
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Right, agreed on this approach. To challenge wealth and power in any kind of 
dramatic way was to be subversive of the state itself and not only of the privileged 
within it. The main difference during this phase as compared with the inter-war period 
was that domestic-based activism against inequality was not a big factor in post-war 
politics in the decades after 1945. The protests were over foreign policy, 
militarisation, Vietnam and the deployment of nuclear weapons. Radical change to the 
liberal capitalist order was not permitted, it was true, but even the watered-down 
version of social democracy that was allowed to surface proved itself reasonably 
robust at obviating domestic calls for political transformation, at least in comparison 
with the conflict-riven administrations that had gone before. In 1945, the United 
Kingdom elected a Labour government with a mandate to introduce changes which 
were to lead to what became known as the ‘welfare state’. Circumscribed by their 
constitutions, the political parties in power in continental Europe were nevertheless 
able to adopt welfare-oriented policies, and did so whatever their ostensible political 
complexion. Emerging from a period of destructive war, the economies of all these 
states entered into a cycle of growth, giving social policies aimed at increased fairness 
and equality a chance to bed down (Piketty 2014: 96-9). Even the United States saw 
living standards rise and the gap between rich and poor narrow, especially with the 
implementation of legislation enacted during the presidency of Lyndon B Johnson in 
the 1960s (a trend maintained by his successor Richard Nixon).   The US and Western 
Europe still had their Communist enemy in their sights, but the complaints of their 
fellow-travellers in these states about impoverishment lacked the bite of the inter-war 
period – social democracy was proving an effective firewall against popular 
(Communist) revolution, and the societal direction of travel was (albeit modestly) 
towards greater equality (Carrillo 1977). 
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There was still an external enemy to be sure and security demanded a control 
on the liberty of its domestic supporters so as to impede its success. But the link 
between this threat and those protesting economic and social deprivation at home 
became an implausible one: social democracy was doing its best and even its severest 
critics on this score were not as vulnerable to accusations of being an ‘enemy within’ 
as had been the case during previous generations of greater poverty. With capitalist 
democracy seemingly entrenched, energy turned to more personal issues; the 
domestic conflicts of the late 1960s and 1970s were increasingly over race, identity, 
gender, sexual orientation.  As they did so, it became ever more apparent that the 
Soviet alternative – and it followed, its domestic supporters – had little of any 
relevance to offer. The moral strength of the Soviet challenge to defensive social 
democracy had in any event by then already entered into the sharp decline that was 
eventually to lead to the implosion of 1989 – Hungary in 1956, Prague in 1968 and 
then the exposure of the human rights abuses of both the Moscow authorities and its 
satellite administrations in eastern Europe irretrievably hollowed out the socialist 
vision it purported to offer the west. And with that loss of credibility went the 
plausibility of any claim that domestic radicals were intent on fomenting Soviet 
revolution. 
 
Gradually, as the real threat from the Soviet empire receded, confidence began 
to return. The oligarchic rulers of the USSR were drawn into a policy of détente and 
then an arms race designed to destroy their capacity to compete, the Soviet leadership 
realising ‘that the country could not compete with the US’ (McCauley 2008: 443). 
Not only was the link between communist revolution and protest about social and 
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economic conditions implausible; so too, increasingly - and definitively after 1989 - 
was the very idea of a Soviet threat. And if the Soviets posed no domestic threat, why 
bother with the social democracy firewall, with all its suffocating implications for 
market freedom and capital accumulation?   But equally, without the Soviets what 
alibi could there be for controlling domestic dissent? Of course the Soviet spectre had 
never been the sole reason for social democracy in Europe – and nor was its sudden 
departure the explanation without more for the sharp rise in the confidence shown by 
those hankering after a more purely market-drive world.  That said the Soviet Union’s 
sudden departure from the stage was undoubtedly a factor in the increase of social 
democratic vulnerability, in the change of the weather around it, just as the fear of 
communist revolution was now also something that could no longer be almost 
casually offered up as the definitive explanation of the control of all radical speech 
when the circumstances demanded. A new way of describing the world was required. 
 
Contriving a Golden Age 
 
Exploring that new description requires us to return to the present so as to be able to 
end with our third question, about our likely future. It has been argued here that the 
concessions made by the wealthy and powerful promoters of capital to democracy and 
equality (expressed through the hegemony of social democratic politics and reflected 
in the protection of human rights and the neutrality of a fairly applied rule of law 
which we have just discussed) were always at least partly rooted in fear, not 
conviction. The spectre of 1917 hung over the opulent status quo in the way that 1789 
had over its members’ aristocratic predecessors a century before. The horrors 
predicted by the privileged about what would happen to them in the event of the 
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embracing of universal suffrage, a commonplace of late 19
th
 century elite discourse 
(Keane 2009: 568-73), had not of course materialised, not least because of the 
reactionary rear-guard actions described earlier in this article.  Much had been lost by 
the wealthy, it was true, but even at the high point of social democracy great gulfs had 
persisted between rich and poor.  
 
The knot was unravelled by a reworking of what liberty meant, not a dramatic 
shift towards universality but rather a return to the partiality of the pre-democratic era, 
this time disguised – a nod to the continuing power of the universalist past – by the 
appearance of respect for equality before the law, for human rights for all and for the 
moral force of democratic choice. The effect has been to reproduce the inequalities of 
the past (with the present data concerning which this article started) by recreating a 
society in which liberty has once more become an accessory of affluence but where 
nowadays the pose of universality has disguised this fact, in the process making other, 
more genuinely egalitarian approaches to liberty appear old hat, redundant, out-of-
date. Emboldened by its victory, capital and the privileged defenders of its partial 
distribution of resources have forged a new common sense.  The fuel driving this set 
of fresh truths has come to be known as neo-liberalism (Harvey 2005).  Starting in 
south America and given prominence in the 1980s by the administrations of Ronald 
Reagan in the US and Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom (Keegan 1984), neo-
liberalism quickly took root; freed of the pressures imposed by social democratic 
assumptions, and with the market now (thanks to the success of this ideology) 
seeming to offer a definitive route to universal freedom, the figures quickly moved in 
the direction of greater inequality.  Without the protective spectre of its revolutionary 
Communist outriders and unequivocally committed to a democratic status quo that 
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still bared the scars of its origins in profound inequality, social democracy had little 
ammunition with which to resist the growing hegemony of the market. In asserting 
itself, neo-liberalism was able also to draw on a new economic order that had been set 
up to support the liberal peace after the war but which had been quite consciously 
designed from the outset to sit outside the liberal/social democratic world that was 
being then erected in that part of Europe not under Soviet control. The various 
financial institutions created to police the Bretton Woods agreement, and so watch 
over the activities of the ‘sovereign’ states within the US sphere of influence, had 
never been constrained by any of the concessions to anti-market sentiment made at 
national level, and now these came into their own (see Schifferes 2015). 
 
The decade that brought the 20
th
 century to an end can be seen as a pause in 
history, a moment when proponents of pre-democratic market freedom drew breath 
and wondered just how far they could possibly go. Taking advantage of an already 
ravaged working class and a deeply embedded sense of individual autonomy, the 
Reaganite reconstruction of freedom in the US continued to gather pace through the 
1990s in a way that has proved so successful that there is now next to no progressive 
politics in that country:  ‘it’s called the American dream because you have to be 
asleep to believe it’ (Carlin 2005; see further Brown 2015; Fraser 2015). Immediately 
following the collapse of the Soviet Union and with the enthusiastic assistance of 
constitutional and legal experts from the West (the US in particular), Moscow’s failed 
empire was reconstituted as a series of market states, each coalescing around 
institutions ostensibly rooted in law, democracy and the protection of human rights 
(Bobbitt 2003).  The idea that a new ‘gilded age’ could be achieved through a neo-
liberalism operating under cover of the social democratic language of democracy and 
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human rights was taking hold (Brown 2015).  In the liberal democratic West market 
reforms were certainly embraced to a degree in the UK but were received more 
tentatively elsewhere. Unlike in the US, unions (even in the UK) were still effective 
in the political sphere. Street resistance emerged in the form of the anti-globalisation 
groups that took as their especial mission the disruption of the meetings of world 
leaders.
xi
  So it was not surprising that the shift of wealth from the poor to the rich 
could not be entirely masked and as a result encountered deep opposition within the 
hitherto social democratic polity of western Europe. This was especially the case in a 
European Union that that not long before recast itself as a social as well as economic 
community.
xii
 And of course we should recall that at this time no external enemy 
existed to render credible the need to control dissent on the basis of some notional 
challenge to the integrity of the state.   The 1990s saw the playing out of a series of 
battles between these rival forces fighting for their respective views of the obvious: 
the UK rejection of the EU’s social chapter; police controls on anti-globalisation 
protestors that were often framed as in accordance with rather than in violation of 
universal conceptions of liberty;
xiii
 the growth of the pressure of marketization 
seeping into Europe from West, East and across the English channel. 
 
If all this represented a hollowing out of liberty, what of security? In the first 
decade of the 21
th
 century two great events shook the political systems of the world 
out of their post-World War Two shape and pushed them further in the direction of 
neo-liberalism and its constitutional sister neo-democracy than had been possible in 
the immediate aftermath of Communist collapse.  The first were the attacks of 11 
September 2001, generative as these were of a reframing of what we now believe a 
democracy (or a regional or international organisation) to be able to do to resist an 
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external threat while still remaining committed to democratic values, the rule of law 
and respect for human rights.  After 11 September 2001, in other words, we have 
learnt to understand in a new way the values of liberty and security to which we 
nevertheless still believe we are committed, one that allows many things that a 
generation before we would not have contemplated (Gearty 2013). The mode of 
achieving this has been to foreground once again the situation of emergency - 
something that is not at all new but has been, as this paper argues, a feature of 
democratic politics since these first arrived at the start of the last century.  
 
Of course the terrorism threat has hardly been connected to opposition to neo-
liberal reforms: as earlier noted the link between contemporary global terrorism and 
resistance to neo-liberal agendas is not easily (or plausibly) made: Al-Qaida outriders 
are not organising opposition to the bedroom tax. The self-evident disjunction 
between the two has however not prevented the occasional connection being made in 
a way which has allowed deployment of wide-ranging terrorism laws to control the 
political expression of dissent, both from government policy generally and market-
oriented preferences in particular. Thus to focus again on the UK, an infamous 
example of the first of these arenas of control was the ejection of Walter Wolfgang 
from the then governing Labour Party annual conference in 2005 for heckling the 
foreign secretary, the supposed legal basis for preventing his return being asserted by 
the police on the spot to be s 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000.
xiv
 So far as the second is 
concerned a notorious example, subsequently ruled a breach of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, was the use of the same police power to hinder 
effective protest at and around an arms fair.
xv
  The move is easier than might be 
thought on account of the breadth of the definition of terrorism in the parent law 
 26 
(Terrorism Act 2000 s. 1). Even if this were not the case, a recent broadening of 
government attack in the UK from terrorism to violent extremism to extremism, the 
last of these terms defined in loose terms as an affront to British values, has already 
led to police linkages between threats from terrorism proper and from other anti-
austerity ‘extremists’ such as the Occupy movement (Quinn 2015). In a similar way a 
plethora of law enforcement agencies constituted under the title the Domestic Security 
Alliance Council have been instrumental in coordinating the severe crackdown on 
Occupy in the US that took place in Autumn 2012, the FBI frequently describing the 
movement as posing a ‘terrorist threat’ in the documents procured under freedom of 
information legislation that have detailed the Bureau’s actions (Wolf 2012). 
 
Mention of Occupy and austerity takes us to the second great defining moment 
of the first decade of the 21
st
 century, as much a breakthrough for neo-liberalism as 
the attacks of 11 September 2001 had been for neo-democracy. The consequences of 
the economic collapse of 2008 have been enormous and are still being felt. Great 
levels of impoverishment have resulted, across the world. The international and 
regional institutions created after the Second World War, outside (as already noted) 
the social democratic framework of sovereign states, have imposed financial measures 
on debtor countries that have been devastating in their effect. Neo-liberalism has been 
so dominant that it has contrived to embed itself as the solution to the problems that it 
itself had largely created (Nolan 2015). All the while the gap between rich and poor - 
already growing fast after 1989 - has continued to rise.  There is no end in sight; 
resistance politics persists but remains as protest not as a source of alternative ideas 
for aspirants to power (Schäfer and Streeck 2013; della Porta 2015). There has been 
no appetite to ditch the values of the 20
th
 century, the assumptions about the pivotal 
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importance of democratic government, the rule of law and respect for human rights: 
controls on the protests provoked by the policies of austerity (themselves entailing an 
‘economic policy akin to neoliberalism’ (Salomon 2015)) have operated within not 
outside conventional rules.  Perhaps the beneficiaries of the new economic order 
believed they value these ideals themselves; perhaps those who make their opinions 
for them judge that their explicit jettisoning would be too dangerous, given the anger 
of the present moment.   
 
Whichever it was, the terms democracy, the rule of law and human rights have 
however been increasingly hollowed out to reflect the new reality (Brunn et al. 2014; 
Kochenov et al. 2015).  And so these values find themselves being used to mask 
policies designed to impoverish, persuading those who are victims of deliberate acts 
against them that their human rights are in fact being complied with, that the law is 
indeed being applied equally, that the decisions that hurt them so terribly are in truth 
reflections of a thought-out and fairly arrived at majority view (O’Connell 2013). At 
times the values of the past have even begun simply to be set aside where neo-
liberalism cannot any longer operate under camouflage: a parliament is ignored, a 
people told to think again, a court ruling appealed to a more politically sensitised 
tribunal (Nolan 2015). When the governor of the Bank of England warns that growing 
inequality ‘risks undermining the basic social contract of fairness’ as Mark Carney 
did in late May 2014,
xvi
 it is time to take note. With its insistence on ‘British values’ 
in a way that expands the zone of control for non-violent protest, the UK 
government’s recent Prevent guidance threatens a further sharp move in this direction 
(Prevent, 2015). Will neo-democracy continue to act as a cover for neo-liberalism but 
in the process becoming ever emptier until finally it is jettisoned completely, or do the 
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tools offered by social democracy still have some legal/democratic/human rights bite 
against market power in both its social (Nichols 2014) and political manifestations 
(Amnesty International 2014)? The hollowing out may leave nothing of substance in 
the values that we think we believe in. What then? 
 
Conclusion 
The late Richard Ericson has used the term `counter-law' to describe what 
Boukalas has described as ‘the advance in the context of counter-terrorism of 
extra-legalism and generalized surveillance of trends that reverse the logic and 
principles of (criminal) law, without disrupting its formal shape’ (Ericson 
2009; Boukalas, 2014).  Certainly there are connections between what is 
argued for here, building on Liberty and Security (Gearty 2013), not only with 
Ericson but also with the permanent state of exception envisaged by Giorgio 
Agamben (Agamben 2005). As Boukalas’s thoughtful review of Liberty and 
Security makes clear, the work of Colin Crouch (Crouch 2004), Jean C Paye 
(Paye 2007) and, more recently, Wendy Brown (Brown 2015) also has obvious 
resonances (Boukalas 2014). Michael Wilkinson is on not dissimilar ground 
talking about the ‘authoritarian liberalism’ of Europe (Wilkinson 2015). The 
author has himself recently expanded this reading into the arena of the 
European Union, drawn heavily from the critical perspective of Wolfgang 
Streeck (Gearty 2015; Streeck 2014).   
 
In the background of any kind of discussion of the sort pursued here is 
the challenge laid down by Loader and Sparks to think seriously about ‘the 
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place that crime, punishment and – increasingly – security have come to 
occupy within the social relations and political cultures of contemporary 
western societies over the last several decades – notably, but by no means only, 
in the United Kingdom and the USA’ (Loader and Sparks 2011: 2).  If impact 
is to be achieved by a scholar – and an underlying assumption here is that it 
should be strived for – it will be primarily through the credible claim for 
authority made by the academic intervener, not just ‘listen to me I am a prof’ 
but ‘listen to me because I know well that segment of the world that you are 
seeking to understand and deal with.’ Knowledge of this sort is most effective 
when it is multi-faceted; though originating in a deep knowledge of one 
perspective it draws others in and connects with them in an open and free-
flowing way.  The specialist silo is necessary to establishing authority. Leaving 
that silo is essential if impact outside academe is to be achieved. This article is 
offered as a sideways route into the ideas that frame so much current thinking 
in the ‘self-consciously “applied” undertaking’ that Loader and Sparks believe 
criminology to have been from its inception (Loader and Sparks: 3).  
 
Security studies have been valuable in deconstructing assumptions about what 
security entails, assumptions that have served all too often to buttress neo-democratic 
efforts to protect us all from the realisation that gross and rising levels of inequality is 
a price that a neo-liberal society chooses to pay for the market freedoms that benefit 
only those with the resources to access them. The link with liberty is an important one 
because too often – that inextricability again - are we led to assume that the reduction 
of liberty is an (inevitable) price paid by the exigencies of the ‘security situation’, or 
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the demands of ‘national security’. The language of liberty and security needs to be 
won back from the libertarians and the counterterrorist practitioners, a struggle for 
meaning in which scholars are necessarily among those on the front line.  Both terms 
need to be reinvigorated with the radical edges that once gave each of them such 
prominent roles in shaping the progressive agenda. Learning from the past equips us 
to fight old battles on new terrain. Even if it comes, the success of neo-democracy 
should be via battle not surrender.  If this entails a politically-engaged academy, then 
we should cheerfully recognise that there are worse fates than to be condemned for 
being partisan. After all, ‘balance’ and ‘neutrality’ are not so much routes to reason as 
instruments for the preservation of the status quo.   
 
                                                 
i
 Lodgings that, it should be said, go well beyond the legal to incorporate ways of looking at the world. 
For recent valuable treatments of a subject that has attracted its fair share of literature, academic and p 
opular see Klug (2015) and Hogan 2015). 
ii
 The negative/positive divide is crudely represented in the distinction between civil and political rights 
on the one hand and social and economic rights on the other: see the international covenants on civil 
and political rights and on economic, social and cultural rights, both 1966 (see Burchill (2007). For a 
take on the transcending of the distinction see Gewirth (1996). 
iii
 As Lenin is reputed to have called those in the West who supported his cause without fully 
understanding the means he judged necessary to realize it.  
iv
 In the UK ‘Britain’s richest 1% have accumulated as much wealth as the poorest 55% of the 
population put together’ (Office of National Statistics, reported in the Guardian 15 May 20-14: 
http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/may/15/britains-richest-1-percent-own-same-as-bottom-
55-population [last visited 21 July 2015]). For the United States see Krugman (2009) and, more 
recently, the New York Times’s Great Divide series overseen by Joseph Stiglitz: 
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/category/the-great-divide/?_r=0 [last visited 21 July 2015]).  
v
 Debs v United States 249 US 211 (1919). See further Schenck v United States 249 US 47 (1919) and 
Frohwerk v United States 249 US 204 (1919). 
vi
 In relation to which the Supreme Court remained happily complicit: Whitney v California 274 US 
357 (1927). 
vii
 HC Debs 1 December 1925 col 2093 (William Joynson Hicks). 
viii
 The Constitutional Court order of 17 August 1956 to this effect can be found at 
http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=3097 [accessed 24 July 2015]. 
ix
German Communist Party v Federal Republic of Germany app 250/57 (20 July 1957): see 
hudoc.echr.coe.int/webservices/content/pdf/001-110191 [last visited 30 July 2015]. 
x
 Dennis v US 341 US 494 (1951). Walker 1990 is a gripping if depressing study.  
xi
  The views of these protestors were effectively captured as well as deepened by Klein (2001). Key 
cases include Appleby v United Kingdom European Court of Human Rights 6 May 2003 and Austin v 
United Kingdom European Court of Human Rights 15 March 2012 (relating to controversial kettling by 
the Metropolitan police which had taken place as long before as 1 May 2001). 
xii
 This move towards the social reached its high point under the presidency of the European 
Commission of Jacques Delors (see Ross1995). 
xiii
Austin v United Kingdom n xi above (relating to controversial kettling by the Metropolitan Police 
which had taken place as long before as 1 May 2001). 
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xiv
See http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1499466/Heckler-82-who-dared-called-Straw-a-liar-is-
held-under-terrorist-law.html [last visited 27 July 2015]. Note however that the Labour Party did issue 
an apology and the incident led to a strong political engagement with the risks posed by the relevant 
section leading to change: Walker 2014: ch 5.  
xv
Gillan and Quinton v United Kingdom European Court of Human Rights 12 January 2010. 
xvi
 http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/acecac0c-e5ba-11e3-a7f5-00144feabdc0.html#axzz34JDMKdzZ And the 
head of the IMF has also recently lamented that ‘inequality hampers growth’ Business Davos 2015: 
http://www.independent.ie/business/davos-world-economic-forum/davos-2015-inequality-hampers-
growth-imfs-christine-lagarde-30930866.html [last visited 3 August 2015].   
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